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DOCTORS, SAMARITANS AND THE
ACCIDENT VICTIMt
BY R. J. GRAY* AND G. S. SHARP'E**
Although the Hippocratic Oath does not specifically impose a duty on a
physician to volunteer aid at a roadside accident,1 certainly most individuals
would agree that a moral duty to do so exists. Yet it is often asserted that many
North American doctors would refuse to stop to render assistance at an accident
scene, and that certainly most would do so only with extreme reluctance. Is this
indeed the case, and, if so, why?
Frankly, having recently participated in a survey of Canadian doctors (all
members of the Ontario Medical Association) which found that over 90 per
cent would stop to help if they saw somebody lying injured along the road,2
one might be inclined to feel that the dimensions of the problem have been
exaggerated. On the other hand, two polls of U.S. physicians in the past ten
years have found that 50 per cent of those who answered said they would
not stop in such a situation,3 citing as the principal reason a fear of possible
malpractice actions.4
tPaper prepared for presentation at the sixteenth annual conference of the American
Association for Automotive Medicine, October 18-21, 1972, at the University of North
Carolina in Chapel Hill, N.C. See, Proceedings, 1972 A.A.A.M. 162.
*Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Ottawa.
lAs quoted in Foxe, The Oath of Hippocrates (1945), 19 Psychiatric Q. 17.
2 See text infra, under heading, Surveys, note 111.
3 See, Newsweek, September 4, 1961, at 41, which reports the result of a survey of
1200 doctors by the Medical Tribune, August 28, 1961, at 23. See also, Chayet, The Legal
Implications of Emergency Care (New York: A.C.C., 1969) at 24, 36, which refers to an
A.M.A. Survey of 7500 doctors in 1963. See, (1964), 189 J.A.M.A. 863.
4This was also the main reason for not stopping suggested by those Canadian doctors
who said they would not stop. See text, infra, under heading, Surveys, note 111.
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Why this marked difference in attitude towards stopping at roadside
accidents should exist between doctors in two jurisdictions with what a casual
observer would take to be remarkably comparable social structures (certainly
the two groups of physicians share almost identical systems of medical training
and qualification), cannot be explored in this paper. One might hypothesize
that such factors as the different litigation systems in the two countries-the
Canadian system sharply discourages speculative law suits while the U.S.
system appears to an outsider to encourage them;5 damage awards given by
Canadian courts being relatively miserly compared to those given by U.S.
courts; and the rather tranquil and restrained view of the problem of mal-
practice suits arising from emergency aid taken by the Canadian media,
medical or otherwise, compared to their American counterparts,6 are relevant.
Other possibilities are legion.
In any event, when one considers that there are some five million personal
injury automobile accidents in North America every year,7 if even one in ten,
and most certainly if half, of those most qualified to render meaningful assist-
ance in such situations would refrain from doing so, then a genuine social
problem of considerable magnitude does exist. This view is reinforced if one
makes what appears to be the valid assumption that those physicians who
answered negatively in the automobile accident situation had no special pre-
dilection against road accident victims as such, and would behave the same
way in any emergency aid situation whether the immediate source of the situ-
ation was a misdirected automobile, a misplaced banana peel or an Act of
God. The number of such emergency aid situations is astronomical.8 If this
assumption is made, then while it is true that in only a fraction of these
situations does this modem version of the Doctor's Dilemma actually arise-
by that we mean that in only a certain percentage, undoubtedly a small per-
centage, of these situations, is a doctor actually put to the decision to be a
Good Samaritan or not-still, and although for obvious reasons no realistic
statistical information can be available, quantitatively a substantial amount of
suffering, even a number of deaths, occur each year which would not occur
if all or more physicians were prepared to render aid in these situations.
What tactics can the law adopt to alleviate this situation? More than
5The lawyer's contingent fee is not merely unprofessional but a crime in most
Canadian provinces. Moreover, in Canada, unlike the U.S., the losing side in a law suit
almost always must pay the winning side's costs, which include the lawyer's fees.
Obviously this discourages speculative and vexatious actions. Only actions with a sub-
stantial prospect of success find their way to court. Of course, equally obviously, the
Canadian system may (on occasion) deter a meritorious claim being pursued because
the plaintiff cannot afford the risk of starting and losing.
6 See, the comments of Governor Kerner of Illinois, note 123, infra. See also, Chayet,
supra, note 3 at 25 and 27.
7 Department of Transportation, Report to Congress and the President, "Motor
Vehicle Crash Losses and Their Compensation in the United States" 2(1971). Indeed,
the October 14, 1972 edition of Business Week (at 40) indicated that "most transportation
fatalities take place on the highways and, . . . There were 53,640 motor-vehicle-related
fatalities ... in 1971. This was down a miniscule percentage from 53,840 deaths in 1970".
8 One recent estimate for the United States is 52 million. See, 7 Status Report, Insur-
ance Institute for Highway Safety, No. 17, September 18, 1972, at 7.
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two-thirds of the United States9 and one Canadian Province10 have some
form of, what is called, the Good Samaritan statute. This is a type of legis-
lation which might fairly be called "negative"-in the sense that individuals
are not required to act but, once they do, they are relieved of liability for
carelessness in the course of their acts. The underlying rationale" of such
legislation is to the effect that physicians-and others--will not only be more
likely to stop but will be more prepared to undertake the type of "rough and
ready" procedures that the urgent nature of the emergency situation may call
for, if they know in advance that their efforts will not be subject to litigious
post mortems. On the other hand, European countries have chosen the stick
rather than the carrot. Instead of the Good Samaritan route, they have pre-
ferred legislation of a "positive" nature whereby individuals are required to
render assistance in emergencies under penalty of fine or imprisonment.
The fact that in both America and Europe specific legislation has been
found necessary to encourage people to help others in distress indicates
rather clearly what the general historical legal position is on both continents.
The Samaritan has been acclaimed as a moral model; the Priest and the
Levite have been our legal models.
Common Law Situation
The common law of England-on which the core legal systems of the
United States and Canada are based-imposes no liability on physicians, or
others, for failing to come to the aid of an accident victim. The only common
law exceptions to the general rule of no liability for omissions fall in those
instances where a special relationship creates a duty to act, such as the failure
of a parent to provide for his child, or of a husband to provide for his wife
when she is helpless.
What we are really talking about here is the imposition of tort liability
for what lawyers call "nonfeasance"-a somewhat mystifying term which
means simply "failure to act". The common law has tended to impose a duty
to act only where the potential actor has created a relationship with another
from which he expects to obtain a benefit. Bohlen, writing in 1908,12
expressed the legal situation as follows:
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental
than that between misfeasance and nonfeasance, between active misconduct working
positive injury to others and passive inaction, a failure to take positive steps to
benefit, or to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the
defendant.
However, the common law position while imposing no duty to act
affirmatively at all goes on to hold that if one begins to act and botches the
9 According to Chayet, supra, note 3, only the following states do not have "Good
Samaritan" legislation: Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota (although it does have a statute establishing the
scope of a physician's duty in an emergency situation), Oregon, Vermont, Washington.
10Alberta, Emergency Medical Aid Act, S. Alta. 1969, s. 3.
11Howell, Good Samaritan Not Liable for Negligent Emergency Care Unless
Wilfully or Wantonly Negligent (1961-62), 40 Texas Law Rev. 909.
12 Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (1908), 56 Univ.
of Penna. L.R. 217.
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job, i.e., if one stops to give aid and these well-intentioned efforts worsen
the injured person's position, then this is misfeasance and civil liability on the
actor can be imposed for the additional injuries, if his actions are sub-
sequently characterized by a court as negligent. Our law thus, in theory at
least, has, as one legal commentator puts it, "created the anomaly of sub-
jecting the incompetent Samaritan to liability while excusing the Levite". 13
If the authors' empiric research based on countless cocktail party
conversations with medical friends can be taken as valid, this is the one
morsel of hard law that all doctors seem to know. If one demands somewhat
more scientific research, the Canadian survey mentioned earlier decisively
supports this observation. 14 This is a pity indeed, since while it is, more or
less, a legal "truth", it is far from being "the whole truth". It fails to point
out that, while it is true that if you spend your life in bed you substantially
diminish the chances of ever being sued, the law, as it must (since otherwise
society would never change or progress), cherishes positive action and only
imposes liability on actors when they have carried on their activities in a
manner well beyond the community pale.15 Moreover, it does not take into
account that the law admires the rescuer 16 and that successful actions against
Good Samaritans occur with about the same frequency as hen's teeth. 17
Most legal commentators' s feel that the common law emergency doctrines
adequately safeguard the Good Samaritan actor. Individuals at the accident
scene are only required to exhibit the requisite degree of skill of a reasonable
man in like circumstances. 19 As the particular circumstances are a crucial
factor, a physician in an emergency situation is not held to the same level
of judgment and performance as he would be under normal conditions. In
practice, not only do the courts refrain from imposing unduly strict standards
13Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed.), at 142. In the words of Cardozo C.J. "The
hand once set to a task may not always be withdrawn with impunity though liability would
fail if it had never been applied at all". Moch Co. Inc. v. Rensalaer Water Co. (1928),
247 N.Y. 160 (N.Y.C.A.)
14See text, infra, under heading, Surveys, Canadian survey, question 3.
15The development of the tort of negligence, at least until very recent times, is really
an effort by the Courts to encourage fruitful activity by reducing the inhibitions on
activity created by the rule of absolute liability of the ancient common law. Instead of
paying simply because you caused injury, negligence law says you pay only for those injuries
you cause through activities carried on in an "anti-social" or "faulty" way. See,
Lord Denning, M.R., in Letang v. Cooper, [1965] 1 Q.B. 232 (C.A.) and Fleming,
The Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) at 7,23.
16 So, for example, when he is injured during his attempt to aid, the courts have
strained to permit him to recover for his injuries: Wagner v. International Railway Co.
(1921), 232 N.Y. 176 (C.A.); Chapman v. Hearse (1961), 106 Commonw. L.R. 112
(H. Ct. Australia); Baker v. T.E. Hopkins Ltd., [1958] 3 All E.R. 147 (Eng. Q.B.D.),
affirmed on appeal [1959] 3 All E.R. 225.
17See, Chayet, supra, note 3 at 24. Also, Note (1963), 51 Calif. L. Rev. 816 at 817.
18For example, Yeutter, 41 Nebraska Law Rev. 609 at 614, states that "it would
thus appear that physicians or nurses rendering emergency medical treatment would
normally have adequate common-law protection against unwarranted liability".
19See, Prosser, Law of Torts (3d. ed. 1964) at 171; Watts v. Herts C.C., [1954]
2 All E.R. 368 (C.A.); Cardas v. Peerless Transportation Co. (1941), 27 N.Y.S. 2d 198;
Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines (1959), 108 So. 2d 409 at 414 (Miss.).
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of care on those rendering assistance during emergencies, 20 they have effec-
tively reduced the standard in favour of Good Samaritans, so that liability can
only be imagined in cases of the most shocking and outrageous errors.21
That this unhappy anomaly of the common law, that you "may be
damned if you do" but cannot be "if you don't", has somehow found its way
into the consciousness of the North American physician is unfortunate,
particularly at a time when there is increasing awareness and concern in the
medical profession over malpractice suits. To the lay observer it is bewildering
that men and women who in every act of their professional lives face the
possibility that if they err grievously they may be subject to civil action, opt
out in the emergency aid situation. There seems to be nothing special about
such situations (except, perhaps, that statistically they may well be the most
unlikely cases to succeed against a doctor) yet there is evidence that particular
fear of malpractice is felt by physicians in Good Samaritan situations and
that a considerable number accept the "out" offered by the common law and
"pass by on the other side of the road".
The American Solution-Negative Legislation
Many North American jurisdictions faced with this problem have not
been satisfied to leave it to the common law and the conscience of those on
the road to Jericho, Peoria or Medicine Hat, and have sought to encourage
physicians and others to be Good Samaritans by limiting or removing their
potential liability for negligence.
In 1959, California passed the first American "Good Samaritan" statute,
which read as follows:
No person licensed under this chapter, who in good faith renders emergency care
at the scene of the emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of
acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.22
From this acorn, some 40 statutory oaks have grown. Although
all are aimed at resolving the same problem, there are wide variations in how
they have gone about the task. This difference in terminology and the paucity
of litigation interpreting the statutes-which may well be indicative of the lack
of effectiveness of the legislation-leaves a number of unanswered legal
questions concerning these statutes.
Some of the Acts, as did the original California bill, absolve only medical
practitioners; others apply to nurses,23 dentists,24 and various para-medical
2OTexas Statute Absolves Tortfeasor from Liability for Negligence in Rendering Aid
During Emergency (1961-62), 75 Harv. L.R. 641 at 642.
21Busacca, Pennsylvania's Good Samaritan Statute-An Ansver to the Medical
Profession's Dilemma (1964), 10 Villanova L.R. 130 at 133.
22 Calif. Bus & Prof. Code, s. 2144. It is suggested, in (1933), 51 Calif. L. Rev. 816,
that the California legislation sprang from an incident at Squaw Valley where a doctor
who was present at the scene of a serious ski accident failed to help the victim who sub-
sequently died for lack of the immediate treatment he could have given. His explanation
was that he feared a malpractice action if he erred in the primitive conditions.
23For example, Nebraska; also California since 1963; Alberta.
2 4 For Example, Mississippi.
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personnel,25 while some extend protection to everyone.26 Some statutes protect
all trained physicians, 27 while others protect only those physicians licensed
within the state which enacted the law.28 Statutes exempting only physicians
or other limited groups may be subject to attack as "class" legislation in that
they permit one group of individuals special considerations not accorded
others. That there is an element of absurdity in this position becomes evident
when one considers that a non-medical person who volunteers assistance may
be held legally accountable for his actions while the only individual fully
trained to render emergency care would be immune from the consequences
of his negligent acts.
Another problem involves the ambiguity in most such statutes regarding
the degree of misconduct that will be immune from civil action. Some states
such as California, Delaware and Georgia appear to have created an absolute
immunity for the Samaritan doctor, provided certain conditions have been
met. Most have drawn back short of complete immunity and retained the
possibility of liability in cases where there is "gross negligence" 29 or "wilful
wrong 30 or "wilful or wanton misconduct"31 or "acts or omissions intention-
ally designed to harm '32 or various combinations of these possibilities.
33
The Florida statute34 appears to a myopic foreigner to be some sort of
legislative sleight-of-hand. It states, in part, as follows:
Any person, including those licensed to practice medicine, who renders emergency
care treatment... shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of any
act.., where the person acts as an ordinary reasonable prudent man would have
acted under the same or similar circumstances. (emphasis added)
Since the emphasized portion is the ordinary legal test for negligence, it
seems to be saying that there is no liability except when the actor is negligent.
What the legislature giveth, the legislature taketh away.
35
When is negligence "gross" or "wilful" or "wanton!' as compared with
plain-wrapped, old fashioned or "venal"? This is a mystery that has kept
generations of lawyers occupied when such terminology has appeared in other
statutes. 36 What experience has taught is that such terms are an invitation to
25 For example, Maryland exempts ambulance and rescue squads.
26For example, Texas and Wyoming.
27For example, South Dakota, Alaska and Pennsylvania. Massachusetts is unique in
extending the coverage of the Act to Canadian licensed physicians.
28 For example, California, Utah and Virginia.




33 Michigan, Indiana, Kansas, Montana, Rhode Island.
34 Fla. Stat. Ann. s. 768.13 (1965) as set out in Chayet, supra, note 3 at 278.
35 One concedes that some protection does flow to doctors if the section is read as
saying "any person, including doctors, will be judged by the standard of the layman". This,
however, cuts across the usual formulation of the negligence test which ordinarily takes
account of the superior skills of the doctor as part of the "circumstances". See Prosser,
Torts (3d. ed. St. Paul: 1964) at 164. If the section is not a trick on doctors it certainly is
on the layman who it also apparently means to encourage to stop. See also the Maine
statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., c. 66, s. 9-A (1963) which may also suffer from this difficulty.
36See Prosser, Torts (3d ed., St. Paul: 1964) at 183-91.
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litigation. To the extent that Good Samaritan legislation is intended to shield
physicians from the vexation of being involved in law suits, those statutes
which fail to grant absolute immunity are doomed to failure in effecting this
purpose.
Many of the Good Samaritan statutes37 require as a condition of immun-
ity, whole or partial, that the physician-or other person-act in "good
faith". Few define the term. Are we dealing with a subjective standard where-
by we are only to consider the state of mind and intentions of the physician,
or is the standard of "good faith" an objective evaluation? One author38
suggests that the individual must make three decisions which will later be
examined in the light of an objective standard. He must conclude that an
emergency situation in fact exists; that immediate emergency care is neces-
sary, and that he is competent to provide the type of assistance which the
victim's condition demands. Pennsylvania has attempted a partial definition:
"Good faith" shall include, but is not limited to, a reasonable opinion that the
immediacy of the situation is such that the rendering of care should not be post-
poned until the patient is hospitalized. 39
Without repeating the comments made above concerning the problems of
'degrees of negligence', it is probably fair to say that they are apposite to
the notion of "good faith".
The 1961 Texas Statute,40 which contains a "good faith" clause, has an
added ingredient that has been widely copied. 41 To qualify for the exemption
from civil liability the services must have been rendered without compensation.
A physician is thus forced to act as a true Samaritan in that, should he desire
the protection of the statute, he apparently cannot charge for services rendered
in the emergency situation, although he is entitled to do so under established
doctrine.42
This aspect of the Texas legislation has a certain logic. If the doctor is
to receive a special immunity perhaps he should not be able to claim remuner-
ation in the same way as when he renders services that carry with them the
risk of civil liability. This could be considered the price he pays for the
privilege. As one commentator has pointed out:
the requirement that the care be gratuitous changes the whole emphasis of article
'1(a)' from the needs of the victim, to the injustice of holding a good Samaritan
liable, while a Levite goes free.43
On the other hand, one does not have to be a cynic to ask whether such a
condition will not in practice inhibit the major objective of the legislation,
i.e., to encourage the prospective Samaritan to stop. If a physician (or any-
body else for that matter) expends considerable time and effort in ministering
37 For example, California, Texas, Virginia amongst others. Arkansas uses the term
twice in its section. Ark. Stat. Ann. s. 72-624 (1963).
38Busacca, supra, note 21 at 135.
39Pa. Stat. Ann., s. 1642 (1963)
4OTex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Article 12.
41 For example, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Alberta.
42 Cotnam v. Wisdom (1907), 104 S.W. 164 (Ark.).
43 Howell, supra, note 11 at 915.
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to an accident victim, why should he not be entitled to claim reasonable
compensation? Or, put another way, time being the "stock-in-trade" of the
professional, might not the doctor, in fact, be positively discouraged from
stopping by this provision?44
Most American statutes require that an emergency situation exist at the
site of an accident in order for the provision to apply. Indeed, the Alaska
statute requires that the "emergency circumstances" must "suggest that the
giving of aid is the only alternative to death or serious bodily injury".45 Does
this mean that if a doctor stops to aid an individual injured in an automobile
accident and discovers that the person is not seriously injured, then the
physician is denied the protection of the statute? For what duration is the
situation considered to be an "emergency"? Does the statute also apply to
exempt the physician from liability in "emergency" situations in the hospital
or in his office? If the injured person was at fault in the situation so that,
strictly speaking, it was not an accident, does this mean that statutory immun-
ity will be denied the physician? The statutes do not answer these queries.
Another legal difficulty besetting Good Samaritan legislation in the
United States is that there is a possibility, at least, that many of these statutes
may be unconstitutional. Many state constitutions provide that everyone shall
have a legal remedy for harm done his person or property. It is clear that
Good Samaritan legislation serves to deny one citizen's right to recover
damages he might otherwise claim from another citizen. It might well be
doubted whether the benefit to the public which constitutionally warrants the
restriction of certain rights counterbalances the detrimental effects to the
rights of the individual in these instances.46
The careful wording of the relevant New York State legislation appears
to prevent many of these ambiguities, although it retains the "gross" negli-
gence difficulty:
Any duly licensed physician or surgeon who voluntarily and without the expectation
of monetary compensation renders first aid or emergency treatment at the scene
of an accident or other emergency, outside of a hospital, doctor's office or any
other place having proper and necessary medical equipment, to a person who is
unconscious, ill or injured, shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to
have been sustained by such person or for damages for the death of such person
alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of first
aid or emergency treatment unless it is established that such injuries were or such
death was caused by gross negligence on the part of such physician or surgeonA7
Without doubt, the Good Samaritan statutes have created a host of
intriguing legal problems. This is a delight to law professors and is not really
a particular condemnation of the statutes or their draftsmen, since it is an
almost inevitable result when legislatures take off in new directions. A Model
Good Samaritan Act has been proposed which, if drafted with enough
44 Chayet, supra, note 3 at 31.
45Alaska Stat., s. 80.64.365 (1962).
46See, Note, (1963), 43 Boston U.L. Rev. 140; (1964), 10 Catholic 322; (1964-65),
48 Marq. L. Rev. 80 at 83.
47N.Y. Educ. Law #6513(10) McKinney (1964).
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perception and enacted generally, could resolve many of the ambiguities
suggested above.48
The important question, however, is not that of interpretation but
whether or not the statutes are accomplishing their avowed purpose of encour-
aging people to stop to aid accident victims. On this issue, there is little
evidence. One piece of negative evidence is that, in spite of the fact that these
statutes are replete with interpretative difficulties, there seem to be no cases
which have surfaced in the law reports raising these issues. 49 This may well
suggest their utter irrelevancy. On the other hand, it is arguable that this
demonstrates their complete efficacy in discouraging ingrate aid recipients
from suing Samaritans. Balanced against this latter view, is, as previously
pointed out, the almost complete absence of any such cases under the pristine,
common law rules.
In any event, unravelling this mystery would not answer the crucial
question: Do more doctors--do more people-act as Samaritans when
shielded by a Good Samaritan Statute? Here, there are some faint clues. The
earlier of the U.S. surveys mentioned previously,5 0 found in 1961, that half the
doctors polled would not stop in the Samaritan situation. The later (1963) of
these surveys, by the American Medical Association, found the same split
nationally amongst those polled although in the meantime there had been a
considerable spread of Good Samaritan legislation. The possibly significant
item in this survey is that ten per cent more doctors in states without Samari-
tan legislation would stop, than in states which had actually enacted Samaritan
laws. 51 Probably the Scottish verdict of "not proven" still applies to the ques-
tion of the usefulness of these statutes; but there is at least some evidence
that after a dozen years of trial of the "negative" approach, a North American
change of direction to a "positive" one may now be appropriate.
The European Solution-Positive Legislation
Although historically sharing the position of the common law on the
lack of any obligation to be a Good Samaritan, 52 European countries, West
and East, have arrived at a stance almost completely opposite to that of
North American jurisdictions which have passed so-called Good Samaritan
laws. European law, rather than maintaining our position, that one is free
to pass on the other side of the road, or adopting our tactic of encouraging
people to stop by offering them a legislative shield from civil liability for any
additional injury they may inflict upon the person they are attempting to aid,
48See the efforts of Miller and Zimmerman, "The Good Samaritan Act of 1966: A
Proposal" in The Good Samaritan and the Law (N.Y.: 1966) 279. Their proposed statute
deals with a much broader spectrum of Samaritan problems, for example, the problem
of compensation to the Samaritan injured while assisting the police or attempting to
prevent the commission of a crime. Our problem, of the liability of the Samaritan to the
person he tries to help, is dealt with in secs. 10 and 12 of the statute.
49 Comment, (1965), 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 287 at 293.
5OSupra, note 3 of paper.
51Chayet, supra, note 3 at 36.
52Amos and Walton's, Introduction to French Law (3d ed. Lawson, Anton and Brown,
1967) at 218. See also, Tunc, "The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan", in The Good
Samaritan and the Law (N.Y.: 1966) 48.
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has simply required all persons to aid those they find in distress. In other
words, it is today, in most European countries, a crime to fail to be a Good
Samaritan.
Starting in Portugal and the Netherlands over 100 years ago,53 the
movement toward penalizing those who act in the manner of the Priest and
the Levite has spread to most of those countries which share the great legacy
for good of Napoleon, the legal system derived from the Napoleonic Code.
Those countries, in fact, constitute most of the rest of the world, excluding
those of us who acquired our basic legal system through the accident of
history of having been at one time or other part of the British Empire, but
including, perhaps surprisingly, to a substantial extent, the Communist Bloc
countries.
Since France has been the source both philosophically and legislatively
of the considerable post-war momentum of this movement, let us examine
in some detail the French legislation and experience. Article 63 of the French
Penal Code (1941) as amended in 1945 and 1954 reads, in the part that
is germane, as follows:
1. Any person who, by his immediate action and without danger to himself or others,
could have prevented either a felonious act or a misdemeanour involving bodily
harm, wilfully fails to do so, shall be punished by jailing for no less than three
months nor more than five years and by fine from 360 to 15,000 francs, or other
punishment...
2. Any person who wilfully fails to render or to obtain assistance to an endangered
person when such was possible without danger to himself or others, shall be subject
to like punishments .. .54
The pedigree of this section is less than impeccable since in its original
form-the first paragraph only-it was promulgated by the Vichy government
under pressure from the German authorities in Occupied France.55 With its
emphasis on requiring people to act, when they could do so safely, to prevent
the commission of crimes involving bodily harm, it had some marginal use
in dealing with the Resistance. 56 However, that it was, in actuality, simply a
logical progression from the moral notions of mutual responsibility and
"engagement" 57 which were, by the 1940's being widely incorporated into
French law, is underlined by the fact that the French Assembly confirmed
the legislation following the Liberation in 1945 and in 1954 broadened it to its
present form which effectively requires people to act as Good Samaritans or risk
penal consequences. The strength of French feeling on this issue is also
53Portugese Crim. Code, art. 2368 (dates from 1867); Dutch Penal Code, art. 450
(dates from 1881). Italy, Poland, Denmark, Rumania and Norway have Samaritan type
provisions which pre-date World War II. See, The Good Samaritan and the Law, supra,
note 52 at Dawson, at 70, Rudzinski, at 91-92.
54The French Penal Code, Comparative Criminal Law Project (New York University:
1960).
55Tunc, Commentaire (1946), Dalloz Legislation 37 at 38.
56Somewhat comparable legislation, requiring citizens to assist peace officers when
called upon to do so, is in force in many common law jurisdictions. For example, see
1972 Canadian Crim. Code, s. 118(b); Neb. R.S. s. 28-728 (1964).
57For an outline of the historical and philosophical background, see Thorpe, The
Duty to Act: The French Experience and the New York Jurisdiction (1965-66), 21-23
Intramural L. Rev. 87.
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indicated by the fact that, of all the countries which, like France, impose
penalties on those who fail to act as Good Samaritans, France's maximum
(up to five years in prison) is the most severe.
It is sometimes suggested that "positive" legislation of this sort, while
something of an adornment to the statute book, will have little effect, at least
so far as applications of the statute through prosecutions is concerned.
Although it may well be true that the major role of such legislation will be in
reinforcing community attitudes in favour of assisting those in distress, the
French experience suggests that atrophy is not the fate of such statutes.
Article 63 has been applied regularly in the French courts.
Obviously, Article 63(2) is not an attempt to create a precise set of
regulations to deal with the myriad situations where one might find one's
fellow-man "endangered". The legislature has spoken in broad terms-in
much the same way as legislatures have made it a crime to drive "negligently"
or to publish "obscenity"-and have left it to the courts to cope with the
details on a case-by-case basis.
Such words as "wilfully", "assistance" and "endangered person"-which
are elements of this crime-require, and have received, interpretation. The
justification permitted to one who has prima facie offended against Article 63
-- of failing to act because there was "danger to himself"-is similarly
amorphous. What is danger? Is the test of it objective or subjective? Do we
look at it through the eyes of the delinquent Samaritan at the time the events
were taking place or through the eyes of the community after the event and
in light of the knowledge then available as to the reality of the risk to the
Samaritan involved?
It is beyond the scope of this paper (and the expertise of the authors)
to pursue the resolution of these legal problems. What, hopefully, might be
of interest is to mention a few of the situations where Article 63 has actually
been applied both to doctors and to laymen. However, the real point to be
made is that such "positive" legislation is alive and well and living in France
-and elsewhere in Europe-and to consider whether this development has
any relevance to the problem of emergency aid to accident victims in North
America.
Early applications of Article 6358 included the successful prosecution
of a pharmacist for failure to notify a doctor of a serious error in a prescrip-
tion he had filled, even though the patient was not in fact injured by the error
and was beyond hope from natural causes when the error was discovered;
of a wife who knew of her lover's intention to kill her husband during a trip,
since she could have prevented the trip of her husband and lover without
revealing the plot or her illicit relations; and of an individual for failure to
hand a drowning man a pole which was lying on the bank. On the other hand,
prosecutions of a defendant for failure to attempt to rescue when another's
immediate action extinguished the fire on the endangered person's clothing,
and of a doctor for failing to respond to a plea for medical help when he did
not have personal knowledge of the danger and of the immediate necessity
for aid, were unsuccessful.
58The following French cases come mainly from Feldbrugge, Good and Bad
Samaritans (1965-66), 14 Amer. J. of Comp. Law 630.
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In one notorious case, a farmer had heard shooting during the night on
his land, where some people were camping. He did not bother to investigate
immediately and the next morning he found a girl covered with blood, who
was still alive. He did not call a doctor or pay any attention to the girl, but
later asked a passing motorcyclist to warn the police. When the police arrived,
the girl was dead. The defendant's argument that the girl was beyond assist-
ance in any event was not accepted by the court as sufficient justification for
doing nothing.
A number of French cases have involved failures on the part of doctors
or quasi-medical personnel to act to assist "endangered persons". In one,
a physician refused to treat a sick child that had been brought to him when
it had taken a turn for the worse. An appeal court reversed the doctor's
acquittal at trial holding that where the danger was "imminent, certain and
requiring immediate action"'59, the doctor should have acted. Thus, although
a physician in France is free generally to select his patients, should he be
summoned to attend an endangered person who is ill or wounded, his right
to select is subordinated to his duty to render aid under Article 63.
In another actual case in France involving a physician, a woman nearly
eight months pregnant became so ill that she had to be placed in an iron lung.
The woman died from her illness, but her pregnancy was normal and the
child was alive. The doctor could have performed a caesarian operation and
thereby have delivered the child alive and normal, but the husband refused
permission, saying that he did not want his wife's corpse disturbed. Assuming
that the doctor must act quickly to save the child, what should he have done
in this situation? In fact, he chose not to intervene to save the child's life.
However, at least one expert60 felt that, under the French Penal Code, the
unborn child would be considered an "endangered person" such that the
physician could have been successfully prosecuted, although the public
prosecutor chose not to do so in this instance.
Physicians constitute one of the major categories of persons prosecuted
under Artcle 63.61 It is interesting to note that, although doctors have objected
to the courts determining such factors as the degree of risk involved and
the imminence of the emergency contrary to their own opinions, the courts
have consistently refused to give physicians the sole responsibility on the
question.
It has been said that Article 63 lacks three characteristics normally
found in modem penal laws; namely, the duty owed by one individual to
another is not based on any pre-existing tie or relationship between the two;
an intention to engage in positive conduct for a specific purpose is not
required, nor is the offence defined with normal juridical precision.62 Be that
59Though on the facts here the doctor was guilty, the effect of this decision was to
narrow judicially the possible scope of prosecutions to those situations where there was
very serious danger to the life of the "endangered person".
60Larguier, French Penal Law and the Duty to Aid Persons in Danger (1963),
38 Tulane L. Rev. 81 at 87.
61Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler (1961), 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 1073 at 1106.
62 See, Thorpe, supra, note 57 at 90, which refers to Rolland, Le Delit d'Omission
(1965), 20 Rev. de Sci. Crim. et Droit Comp. 583.
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as it may, cases are being decided under it regularly and it is, presumably,
playing a part in resolving the dilemma of aid for the accident victim.
The 'positive' approach is by no means peculiar to the 'Western'
European countries. Most of the Eastern bloc nations have adopted com-
parable legislation. A passing glance at how the Soviet Union deals with this
problem will hopefully be instructive. Article 127 of the Russian Criminal
Code, enacted in 1960, states:
Art. 127(1) Failure to Rescue: Failure to render aid which is necessary and clearly
not suffering of postponement to a person in danger of his life, if the offender
knew that such aid could be given without serious danger to himself or other
persons, or failure to inform the proper authorities or persons about the necessity
to render aid, is punished with corrective labour not exceeding six months or with
public censure, or entails the application of socially corrective measures.6 3
Apart from the jargon which calls jail a "socially corrective measure", the
Soviet Article is practically identical to the French Article 63(2). In addition,
Article 157 of the Russian Criminal Code is pertinent. Mentioning physicians
directly, the section requires that they give "medical aid in any situation where
a failure to do so might have serious consequences".
Actually, the obligation to render aid to endangered persons may have
the status of a constitutional duty in the Soviet Union and, thus, pre-date the
Criminal Code provisions.64 A leading Russian legal commentator, Agarkov,
writing in 1938, suggested that failure of a swimmer to endeavour to save a
drowning non-swimmer where he could do so in relative safety, would violate
Article 130 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution.65
Many other European countries, 66 both Western and Iron Curtain, have
enacted similar "positive" legislation. 67 As with the foregoing "negative"
statutes, many variations in form and application exist. For example, two
jurisdictions, Belgium and Finland,68 make the provision applicable not only
to witnesses of the danger, but also to those to whom the situation is described
63RSFSR art. 127. The 1960 provision is very much like that found in the pre-
revolutionary Russian Penal Code of 1903 art. 491; see, The Good Samaritan and the Law
(New York: 1966) at 128.
64Hazard, "Soviet Socialism and the Duty to Rescue" in xxth Century Comparative
and Conflicts Law 160 at 161 (Leyden, 1961).
65 Hazard, supra, note 64 at 167, refers to a 1940 decision of the Supreme Court of
the U.S.S.R. where civil damages were awarded a citizen injured while volunteering to
put out a fire. "His injuries resulted from the performance of a constitutional duty. It [is]
a necessary consequence of the creation of the duty that a citizen injured in performing it
recover damages for injuries suffered in performance."
66 Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Spain,
Turkey, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.
67The following section is based on materials set out in The Failure to Rescue:
A Comparative Study (1952), 52 Col. L. Rev. 631 and Feldbrugge, Good and Bad
Samaritans (1965-66), 14 Amer. J. of Comp. Law 630, from which several of the trans-
lations were obtained.
68Article 422 of the Criminal Code of Belgium (1961): "When he has not observed
personally the danger in which the victim finds himself, he cannot be punished if on the
basis of the circumstances in which he was asked to help, he could believe that the request
was not serious or that there was no danger to the victim." The Finnish Criminal Code
provision applies specifically to doctors, the Belgian to any person.
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by others in seeking their aid. Several countries offer the alternative of inform-
ing others in a position to help rather than personally rendering assistance. 69
In Albania, 70 once a causal connection is shown to exist between the
omission of the accused and the death or injury of the victim, the accused
may suffer "social censure". This might be akin to our publishing the circum-
stances and name of the so-called "bad Samaritan" in his local newspaper.
In Czechoslovakia, 71 the fact that the offender is a doctor, or an individual
otherwise specially qualified to render assistance, is considered an aggravating
circumstance to the offence of failure to rescue.
Certain countries72 focus on the danger, and only inflict liability where
the peril is "grave". On the other hand, in Bulgaria,73 a physician who passed
by an injured person without rendering assistance was convicted under the
statute in that he "left" the individual "knowing" that the "possibility" of
danger to that person's life existed.
In countries such as Hungary74 and Italy,75 death of the accident victim
is made a special aggravating circumstance of the offence of failure to stop,
while, in others, such as the Netherlands, 76 death of the victim is made a
prerequisite for punishment of the potential rescuer.
In some countries, 77 particular reference is made to the individual
capabilities of the potential rescuer, for example, the Norwegian provision is
that he perform "according to his ability". This would, presumably, diminish
the obligation of those with less than normal qualifications-the ignorant or
the handicapped rescuer 78 -or increase the obligation of those with superior
skills or endowment, such as doctors. Almost all the European statutes spell
out that culpability cannot be found if the rescue attempt would have involved
serious risk to the well-being of the potential rescuer, i.e., decency can be
69See, the Finnish Criminal Code and Article 112 of the Criminal Code of the
Ukraine.
70Article 157 of the Albania Criminal Code (1952) permits the punishment of
"social censure". Article 112 of the Criminal Code of the Ukraine employs the term
"public censure".
71Article 207, Criminal Code of Czechoslovakia.
72See, Article 547 of the Criminal Code of Ethiopia (1957) which states that "Whoever
intentionally leaves without helping a person in imminent and grave peril of his life,
person or health, when he could have lent him assistance, direct or indirect, without risk
to himself or to third parties, is punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or fine." This is basically the French position.
73 Under Article 148, Bulgarian Criminal Code, 1951.
74 Article 259, Criminal Code of Hungary (1961). In Hungary a prison sentence
appears to be mandatory; in cases of death the maximum penalty is increased from one
year to three years.
75Article 593, Italian Criminal Code; in case of death, the maximum fine is doubled.
76Article 450 of the Netherlands Criminal Code.
77For example (i) Article 253 of the Criminal Code of Denmark (1930), uses the
phrase "to the best of his power"; (ii) Article 387 of the Criminal Code of Norway uses
the phrase "according to his ability" and (ii) Article 476 of the Criminal Code of Turkey
(1926) requires that the potential rescuer give "that aid which he could give".
78As, for example, the slightly stupid farmer in the famous case of Vaughan v.
Menlove (1837), 132 Eng. R. 490 who was held for negligence even though living up to
the standard of the reasonable man was beyond his capabilities.
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expected, not heroics. In Rumania,79 however, only real danger of death
justifies inaction.
The West German Code, in addition to excusing inaction where there
would be "considerable danger" to the rescuer, underlines the "social engi-
neering" implicit in this type of law-making by specifically referring to "other
important duties" the potential rescuer may have been engaged in, as an item
to be put in the scale deciding whether "in the circumstances" Good Samari-
tanism was required s0 Thus, a fireman on his way to a conflagration or a
physician hurrying to a hospital to operate on one of his patients would not
be expected to stop at an accident en route.
The European legislation has concerned itself entirely with the creation
of criminal sanctions for failure to help endangered persons unlike the North
American legislation which has exclusively looked to the problem of civil
liability and its diminishment. This does not mean that the situation with
respect to civil liability has remained the historical one of the common law
and the continental law systems, i.e., no civil liability for failure to act. On
the contrary, because, as a general principle in European countries, civil
liability follows criminal liability, these countries have effectively reached a
position opposite to ours with respect to the additional harm suffered by the
man on the road through the failure of the passerby to assist him. The Priest
and the Levite are civilly liable!
The reasoning process can be shown by reference again to the French
legislation. Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code require those who
occasion injury to another through "fault" to give redress. Article 63(2) of
the Criminal Code makes it a crime to fail to render assistance to an "endan-
gered person". A breach of the criminal law obviously is behaviour which
can be characterized as 'fault', ergo, liability under the Civil Code sections
for injuries occasioned through this type of fault.81
This, of course, does not obviate the need on the part of the plaintiff
to prove damages and their causal connection to the defendant's fault which
can, in this kind of case particularly, present difficult proof problems. More-
over, French law, as we have suggested is the case in North America both
under the common law and the Good Samaritan statutes, is quite tender
toward the rescuer and will seldom call his well meant efforts, which happen
to go awry, to civil account unless they were monumentally mistaken.8 z
79 Article 489 of the Criminal Code of Rumania.
8OArticle 330(c) of the Criminal Code of Germany (1953) provides as follows:
"Anybody who does not render aid in an accident or common danger or in an emergency
situation, although aid is needed and under the circumstances can be expected of him,
especially if he would not subject himself thereby to any considerable danger and if he
would not thereby violate other important duties, shall be punished by imprisonment not
to exceed one year or a fine."
81See Amos and Walton's, Introduction to French Law, supra, note 52. For an outline
of some of the procedural difficulties, see Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Law at 27.
Also see Rudzinski, supra, note 53 at 111-15.
82 Dawson, supra, note 53 at 71, and Tune, supra, note 52 at 49. Tune states that
"even when failure to rescue does not constitute a crime, civil liability will be incurred
whenever in the judgment of the court a reasonable man would have acted and . ..
prevented the damage."
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As one can observe, a multitude of variations are to be found in existing
'"positive" legislation similar to the state by state variation evident when
"4negative" legislation was considered. As suggested earlier in connection
with the "negative" North American variety, the existence of variations or
interpretive difficulties is not surprising or a matter of serious criticism.
Obviously different jurisdictions will wish to emphasize, more or less, partic-
ular policies, or will gauge the effectiveness of some of the available options
differently. Legislative drafting skills will vary from place to place. Criticism
is valid if the legislation becomes some sort of statutory wart-a fate which
appears to have befallen the North American "negative" Samaritan Acts.
Criticism is demanded if legislation simply fails in its social aim, which, in
the case of Samaritan statutes, is to persuade more people to aid the person
in distress. There is some evidence that the European statutes are effective
in this sense8 3 but, unfortunately, nothing conclusive.
What is very clear is that the European "positive" statutes are not a
dead letter. Surprisingly, they have been thought to be effective in furthering
universal humanistic concerns by countries with political systems as different
as France and West Germany on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and
Ethiopia on the other. It may well be time that we in North America attempted
the "positive" approach.
The European Solution for North America? Some Sociological,
Legal and Moral Views
Is, however, our North American community actually too individualistic
and amoral to permit the imposition of such a duty? Margaret Mead has said
that our obsession with privacy has resulted in mass anonymity in our large
urban centres and in a dulling of our senses which kills neighbourliness and
caring about what happens to others.8 4 The complexity of our contemporary
society has effected a large amount of group despondency on the part of every
individual. "For the most part, the individual must rely on others for his
work, food, shelter, transportation, and he has increasingly come to place
reliance on others for the occupation of his leisure time". 85 The reaction to
this is a feeling that the individual can have no effect in his society, and a
relapse into an apathetic concern for security and personal privacy, epitomized
by the English phrase "I'm all right, Jack". Or, as James Thurber put it,
"Stay where you are, you're sitting pretty".
86
Rosenthal, in his book Thirty-Eight Witnesses, which tells the horrible
story of the Kitty Genovese murder where thirty-eight New-Yorkers failed
to act as Samaritans, even to the minimal extent of phoning the police,
discusses urban apathy: "This apathy was indeed a big-city variety. It is almost
a matter of psychological survival, if one is surrounded and pressed by millions
of people, to prevent them from constantly impinging on you, and the only
way to do this is to ignore them as often as possible. Indifference to one's
83See Zeisel's Study, note 100, infra.
84 Mead, "Our Right to Privacy", Redbook, April 1965, at 15.
85Thorpe, supra, note 57.
S6Thurber, Fables of Our Time (1943) at 3, cited by Gregory, "The Good Samaritan
and the Bad", in The Good Samaritan and the Law, supra, note 63 at 23.
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neighbour and his troubles is a conditioned reflex of life in New York as it is
in other big cities."'87
We swim in such a sea of books, learned articles, crisis journalism and
television documentaries that tell us that we North Americans don't care,
that sometimes one gets the impression that there are quite a few people out
there who do care even if they are only the authors of these jeremiads. While
it is true that we live in an urban society, we don't al live in New York City,
which seems to be universally elected the place one is least likely to meet a
Good Samaritan (probably by people who do not live there). One can appre-
ciate that there are sociological and psychological difficulties in the way of a
widespread burgeoning of the Good Samaritan ethic in North American life88
without abandoning hope that the kind of Samaritanism we are basically
concerned about-not heroics, but simply reasonable efforts to aid the ill,
the injured, and the imperilled-could be fostered by a little legislative
impetus. In any event, if this-to use the vocabulary of Alex, the anti-hero
of A Clockwork Orange---"real horror show"-view of our society is, indeed,
what might be described as the North American Way of Life, are we not
justified in legislatively attempting to alter this life style in some small
measure? The answer, of course, is yes.
The least of the problems standing in the way of North Americans
attempting the European solution to the Good Samaritan problem is existing
legal precedent on "nonfeasance", although there are some who seem to feel
that this position came to us on a stone tablet or, at the very least, directly
from the Founding Fathers. As we have seen, presently under the North
American law, a physician is under no duty to come to the aid of one who is
dying and might be saved (unless a prior physician-patient relationship
existed), nor is an expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees
another drowning before his eyes, required to do anything about it. Some
commentators suggest that the imposition of a duty to act in these situations
is inappropriate to North American jurisdictions as the Anglo-American legal
tradition assigns a less significant role to prevailing notions of morality.89
This kind of argument is singularly unpersuasive. Because historically,
understandably enough, the common law has focused on active misconduct,
is no reason why in 1972 our law cannot move forward to face the somewhat
more subtle problem of anti-social failures to act. The oft repeated phrase
that "with purely moral obligations the (common) law does not deal ' 90 rings
with a false pride in our Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. The accompanying
chestnut that the remedy in such cases is left to "higher law" is, in the authors'
experience, met annually by first year law students with a gigantic horse
laugh. Perhaps they are cynics. More likely, being young, they can still
recognize hypocrisy and specious reasoning when they see it.
87Rosenthal, Thirty-Eight Witnesses (1964) at 92.
88Two of the most perceptive and, in many ways, optimistic discussions of this
problem are in The Good Samaritan and the Law, supra, note 63: Freedman, "No Response
to the Cry for Help" at 171 and Gusfield, "Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans" at 183.
89 Thorpe, supra, note 85.
9OBuch v. Amory Mfg. Co., (1897), 44 Atl. 809 (N.H.).
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The views of Prosser, the leading American writer on Torts, are
representative of most writers in this field on the subject of the common
law's inability to cope with problems of failure to act. In commenting on the
above type of examples, he has stated:
... such decisions are revolting to any moral sense. They have been denounced
with vigour by legal writers. Thus far, the difficulties of setting any standards of
unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible
situations where fifty people might fail to rescue one, has limited any tendency to
depart from the rule to cases where some special relation between the parties has
afforded a justification for the creation of a duty, without any question of setting
up a rule of universal application.91
Prosser's view clearly is that "it's time for a change" in our law on
failure to act. There are already a number of straws in the wind. International
maritime conventions, which have been formally absorbed into our domestic
law,92 require the person in charge of a vessel, so far as he can do so, without
danger to himself or his vessel, to attempt to save any person he finds at sea
in danger of being lost (not just persons with some antecedent connection to
the vessel) or face criminal sanction.93
The Highway Codes of almost all North American jurisdictions require
that those involved in auto accidents not only remain at the scene and report
the accident to the proper authorities, but that they render aid to those
injured.94 Administration of these statutes which turn failure to act affirma-
tively into crimes has proved of no particular difficulty-indeed the charge
of 'failing to report' or 'remain at the scene' of a minor property damage
collision is one of the most common on police court blotters. When it comes
to the serious 'hit and run' type case, the police spare no effort in attempting
apprehension and the courts suffer no apparent judicial difficulty in applica-
tion of the law.
In a number of U.S. jurisdictions, these 'rendering aid' statutes have
been construed as creating civil liability when the person not aided suffers
additional injuries which could have been avoided if aid had been given, even
though the defendant was not negligent with respect to the original accident.95
Indeed, a California case has suggested that the duty to render aid in such a
situation is a matter of common law.96
"The process of extension" says Prosser, "has been slow and marked
with extreme caution; but there is reason to think that it may continue until
it approaches a general holding that the mere knowledge of serious peril...
to another which an identified defendant might avoid with little inconvenience
91Prosser, Torts (3rd ed. 1964) at 336.
9246 U.S. Code Ann. s. 728; R.S. Can. 1952, c. 29, s. 526.
93 As to civil liability, the modem cases hold liability for failure to make reasonable
attempts to rescue: Harris v. Penna R. Co. (1931), 50 F. 2d 866 (4 CA); Matthews v.
MacLdren, [1970] 2 O.R. 487 (C.A.). Cf. the older view found in Vanvalkenburg v.
Northern Navigation Co. (1913), 30 O.L.R. 142 (App. Div.).
94The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 202, s. 140.
95See, Prosser, Torts (3d ed. St. Paul: 1966) at 338: he mentions cases of this sort
in West Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia and California.
96Brooks v. E. J. Willig Transp. Co., (1953), 225 Pac. 2d 802 (Cal.).
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creates a sufficient relation recognized by every moral and social standard,
to impose a duty of action."
97
So much for the supposed difficulties in law of "positive" Samaritan
statutes. We believe they can be met as they already regularly are in Europe
and, to a limited extent, in North America.
What remains as the nagging, unanswered but critical question is, do such
statutes have any effect? It is all very well to say that successful prosecutions
can and do occur under these "positive" statutes; do they increase the numbers
of those who attempt to succour "endangered persons"? Unhappily, there are
no studies that we know of that offer much help in answering this question.
It seems fair to assume that law has some educative impact; that law can foster
community attitudes as well as follow them.98 Statistics are available from the
jurisdictions which have "positive" Samaritan laws showing the number of
convictions for failing to rescue. The numbers are usually small, for example,
sixty-four convictions in France in 1962 for violations of Article 63(2). Does
this mean most people render aid or does it mean that the vast numbers who
may pass by are simply not caught or prosecuted? French commentators99
seem to believe that 63 (2) has had a positive effect, that people do usually
stop, presumably in greater proportions than would have done so in the
absence of the statute. There is nothing very convincing available.
Samaritan Surveys
The most pertinent study we have discovered on the effectiveness of
"positive" Samaritan legislation is that of Zeisel in 1965 in which he posed
three questions around Samaritan situations to groups of university students
in Germany (which has such a statute), Austria and the United States (neither
of which has such a statute),00 The one matter to which a clear answer
emerged was that people do know whether or not aid to the endangered is
a legal duty. Of the Germans, 86 per cent knew of the legal obligation, of
the Americans 81 per cent knew they were not required to render assistance.
To the other two questions, the Germans evinced the most Samaritan attitude.
Three-fifths of the Germans would, if they could make the laws, punish Levite
behaviour, whereas only a quarter of the Americans would, the remainder
preferring to leave it to conscience. In all three countries, those interviewed
felt that about 60 per cent of people faced with the situations would act as
Samaritans, though the Germans were again on the high side and the U.S.
participants on the low.101
Most of the other surveys in the area of Good Samaritanship have been
directed at physicians trying to discover what their response would be to the
97Prosser, supra, note 95.
98Human Rights statutes can surely claim some success of this sort; prohibition and,
perhaps, today, marijuana legislation are notable failures in their educative aspect.
99Tunc, supra, note 52 at 56-62.
10OThe Survey is reported briefly in Zeisel, "An International Experiment on the
Effects of a Good Samaritan", in The Good Samaritan and the Law, supra, note 63, at 209.
101We would like to see the response to the question of how many of those polled
actually would have intervened rather than their estimate of what percentage of their
fellow citizens would have acted.
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call for help, and why. Some of the U.S. surveys have been quite extensive, 1 2
others have been very small samples done for the purpose of law review
comments on proposed Good Samaritan legislation.103 All have consistently
indicated that between half and a third of those responding to the survey
would not respond to the roadside accident victim's (this has been the usual
situation posed) need for assistance, and that the reason for this is the doctor's
fear of malpractice actions.
The most widely cited of these studies was one carried out by a medical
publication called The Medical Tribune in 1961. We, unfortunately, have
been unable to obtain a copy of this publication for first hand perusal and
have had to rely on a summary of its findings printed in a national magazine.104
Parenthetically, we might add that we suspect that this exposure in a national
forum, of these figures, gave considerable momentum to the movement toward
"negative" Good Samaritan legislation which had barely commenced at that.
time. 105 In any event, of the 1200 physicians surveyed, 50 per cent of those
responding replied in the negative, fear of malpractice suits being given as
the principal explanation.
These results accord with the result of the only other large U.S. survey
of which we are aware. This was a survey of 7500 doctors made under the
auspices of the American Medical Association. 10 6 There the national split
was fifty-fifty on whether the doctor would stop. Intriguingly, while only 48
per cent in States which did not have Samaritan Acts would fail to stop, 52
per cent in States which had passed Samaritan statutes would not render aid.
A small survey of 130 Florida doctors conducted by the Florida Law
Review 07 found that almost two-thirds would stop to render aid although
Florida did not, at the time, have a Good Samaritan Act. The responses
indicated that the Florida doctors had seriously erroneous views as to the
standard of medical care the law expected of them if they rendered aid in
such situations, and that they felt civil liability should not lie for simple
negligence in such cases.
Geiser, in his 1961 Boston University study of Massachusetts' physicians, 108
posed an interestingly different, Samaritan type situation. He asked them
how they would respond if they were in a theatre when the following announce-
ment was made: "Is there a doctor in the house?" The results were as follows:
(1) 27% would respond immediately:
102That of the A.M.A. in which 7500 physicians were polled. See, infra, note 106;
(1964), 189 J.A.M.A. 863.
IO3That of S. Kahn for the Florida Law" Review, in which 130 doctors only were
polled. See, infra, note 107.
1O4Newsweek, September 4, 1961 at 41.
105A 'horror' story in Reader's Digest, 1963, at 83, entitled "Why Doctors are Bad
Samaritans" by Kearney, may also have had considerable effect.
106Reported in (1964), 189 J.A.M.A. 863. See also, Chayet, supra, note 3 at 36.
107Reported in (1965), 17 Fla. L. Rev. 586 at 590.
108Cited in Flowers & Kennedy, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis And a
Proposal (1965), 38 Temple L.Q. 418 at 419; and also see Fehlberg, Physicians-Civil
Liability for Treatment Rendered at the Scene of an Emergency (1964), Wisconsin L. Rev.
494 at 497.
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(2) 41% would respond only if no other doctor responded;
(3) 14% would respond 'only if I knew what was wrong';
(4) 16% would not answer at all;
(5) 2% no answer.
Of those in the middle three groups the following percentages cited fear




The situation does not, in our opinion, present as urgent an appearance
of need for emergency aid as the roadside example. It is equivocal whether
the circumstances are such that the doctor who responds will actually be
called upon to exercise his professional skills. Yet the survey response is much
the same. One-sixth of the physicians will not come forward at all in any
circumstances and most of the others will respond only with great reluctance.
The bogeyman of the Samaritan's possible malpractice action is again very
much present in the minds of the doctors.
That the malpractice action arising out of Good Samaritanism on the
part of doctors is indeed a myth has been proven by a 1968 study by the
A.M.A.109 Only 10 physicians out of 40,000 had ever had any kind of diffi-
culty arise from acts of theirs in what might be described as Good Samaritan
situations. Of these ten cases, only two had resulted in payments of any kind-
both in settlements of under $500 made because of their nuisance value-
none had actually resulted in the commencement of an action, let alone a
successful action on the part of the patient.
As to the actual effect of a malpractice action on a physician, there is
some survey evidence that the fears have been grossly exaggerated. Wyckoff,
in a study done in Connecticut, 10 concludes as follows:
Objectively, the effects of a malpractice suit upon a physician appear to be much
less than generally believed. Not one case was found of a physician compelled to
give up his practice and more, no physicians lost their licences, none were rejected
from hospital privileges, staffs, or societies; none were unable to obtain malpractice
insurance though a handful had to switch companies and pay higher rates; none
claimed to have suffered professionally and none suffered socially.
We would underline that he was not speaking of malpractice actions origin-
ating from an act of Good Samaritanism-these do not appear to exist-but
of malpractice actions generally.
The final survey to be considered is the Canadian one, mentioned
previously. In the summer of 1971, with the blessings and assistance of the
Ontario Medical Association, we distributed a questionnaire to some 10,000
109 See Chayet, supra, note 3 at 25.
l1OWyckoff, The Effects of a Malpractice Suit Upon Physicians in Connecticut (1961)
176 J.A.M.A. 1096.
1973]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
physicians in the Province of Ontario-all the members of the O.M.A.11
The questionnaire covered the medico-legal field generally, but eleven of the
questions specifically concerned facets of the Good Samaritan issue. These
questions, and their responses, were as follows:
Question #2
As you are driving along the highway
you are forced to slow down due to
a back-up of cars and notice that the
road is partially blocked by an over-
turned car. Although a man is lying
by the side of the car, injured,
obviously no ambulance or medical
help of any kind has yet arrived. In
this situation, you would
Question #3
If a doctor or any other person who
happens upon such a scene, fails to
stop and offer assistance in such a
situation, he can be held civilly liable
to the injured person for any addi-
tional injury that person suffers
which would not have been suffered
if the assistance that might have
been rendered by the passerby had
been rendered.
Question #4
Failure on the part of a doctor to
stop and offer assistance at the emer-
gency injury scene would be, in your
opinion, most likely due to
Responses: Total 1817






A. stop and offer medical assistance
to the injured person;
B. keep on driving.
Responses: Total 1855





Distribution (%) A) 20.5
B) 79.5
Correct Answer B
A. a feeling that he would not be of
much help;
B. a feeling that his time is valuable
to him for his own purposes,
therefore why spend it on total
strangers;
C. his fear of a lawsuit;
D. his field of study being so spe-
cialized that he has forgotten
much of the basic medical train-
ing or methods needed in such a
situation;
E. a feeling that he might have to
travel a great distance from his
office to give testimony.
l1iThere are some 11,000 qualified physicians in Ontario but approximately 1,000
are not members of the Ontario Medical Association. The evaluation of the responses to
the Osgoode Hall Medical-Legal Questionnaire, prepared by the authors together with
Daniel Paitich, Ph.D., and William Ballard, LL.B. is by no means complete. Some 2200
replies were received but to date only 1900 of these responses have been analyzed. The
authors hope in the near future to be able to publish a complete analysis of the responses.
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Question #5
In the situation described in Q.2, if
a doctor who stops and renders
medical assistance, makes a quite
understandable error in his diagnosis
due to the emergency circumstances
prevailing, with the result that the
course of treatment he pursues,
although administered carefully, and
correctly, causes additional injury to
the accident victim, he (the doctor)
is liable in a civil action to the
injured party for the additional
injuries.
Question #6
In the situation in Q.5 do you feel
that the doctor ought to be held
liable in a civil action to the injured
party for the additional injuries?
Question #7
Given the fact situation in Q.5
except that the error in diagnosis
leading to the additional injury was
elementary in nature and quite inex-
cusable notwithstanding the emer-
gency circumstances, is the doctor
liable in a civil action to the injured
party?
Question #8
Given the fact situation in Q.7 do
you feel that the doctor ought to be
liable in a civil action to the injured
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Question #9
In the past twenty years, there have
been . . . cases of a doctor being
held liable in Canada as a result of
malpractice or negligence in a Good
Samaritan (e.g., stopping at a road-
side accident) emergency situation.
Question #10
Doctors in Canada are directed to
lend assistance to an accident victim
in accordance with:
Question #11
Ontario should enact "Good Samari-
tan" legislation relieving physicians,
registered nurses and other persons,
of potential liability for damages for
injuries to, or the death of a person,
caused through an act or omission
by a physician, nurse or other person
in rendering medical services or first
aid assistance, unless it is established
that the injuries or death were
caused by gross negligence;
Question #41
The law should require of all citizens
an obligation to act to assist some-
body whom he has discovered in a
position of danger or suffering from
incapacitating injury or illness, when
he can give this assistance without













B. the Statutes of Ontario;
C. Canadian Criminal Code;
D. none of the above.
Responses: Total 1848
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A detailed analysis of the responses to these questions is not required
for the purposes of this paper. We have set out the questions and responses
fully, in the belief--quite possibly a mistaken one engendered by misplaced
parental pride-that they have a certain intrinsic interest. A number of the
responses, however, are pertinent to matters raised earlier and to the recom-
mendations we shall be making subsequently. These we propose to consider
in some detail.
The most astonishing response, at least in light of U.S. responses to the
same question, is that to question (2) which indicates that 92 per cent of
Ontario doctors would stop and offer medical assistance to an injured person.
Obviously, if one has to fall by the wayside, Ontario is the place to do it.
We conclude that either there is something wrong with the way we have asked
our question or with the way the other surveys have asked theirs, or there
is a much larger social and cultural gap between our countries or, at the least,
between the medical professions of our two countries, than we would have
supposed.
We have briefly suggested above'12 some hypotheses that might explain
this discrepancy or attitude (assuming it really exists). We would add one
piece of statistical information that might have some bearing on the differing
attitudes. According to a survey made by the A.M.A. in 1963, 14 per cent
of U.S. physicians in practice had been sued for malpractice. 1 3 Probably that
percentage has increased in the past nine years. On the other hand, our
survey indicates that only three and one half per cent of Ontario physicians had,
in 1971, ever been involved in a malpractice action. 114
The responses to two questions, (3) and (10), tend to verify Zeisel's
conclusion that by and large people are aware whether or not the law
presently imposes a legal duty to render aid. Indeed, the proportion of those
who knew it was only a moral duty, four-fifths, is virtually identical to Zeisel's
findings amongst U.S. university students.
Of interest also was that while 91 per cent felt (question 6) that there
should not be liability on the facts of question 5, which, in fact, in law there
would not be, 84 per cent recognized there would be liability in the question 7
situation and, indeed, over two-thirds approved of imposing liability on the
erring doctor in that case (question 8).
Most significant, however, are the responses to questions 11 and 41.
It is something of a surprise to find that a group of which nine out of ten
were prepared to act as Samaritans already and who, by and large, understood
and approved of the legal resolutions of the problem of the Samaritan who
caused further injury to the person he was aiding, overwhelmingly desire
passage of a typical "negative", North American, Good Samaritan statute.
Quite unexpected-illuminating perhaps-is the response to question 41
which presented Ontario physicians with a proposed statute modeled after
many similar European enactments. It is exciting that so many members of a
112 See text, supra, at note 5.
11 As reported in Fehlberg, supra, note 108.
14 Q. 221, Osgoode Hall Medical-Legal Project Questionnaire. Of 1857 respondents,
96.5 per cent had never been a party to a malpractice action, 3.2 per cent had been on one
occasion, and 0.3 per cent had more than once.
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profession (almost 80 per cent) which could be the first caught by such a provi-
sion, nevertheless have come out so strongly in favour of the imposition on
them and others of a positive duty to aid those in danger or suffering from
incapacitating injury or illness. Here then is a piece of unequivocal evidence
that one group of North Americans are prepared to be-at least to a certain
degree-their brother's keepers and would like to see all members of society
obliged to undertake the elementary burdens of this sort in being a Samaritan.
Final Considerations and Recommendations
What conclusions can be reached from this rather long-winded
examination of law, morals and statistics?
The first conclusion we have reached-which we freely admit does not
flow inexorably from what has gone before-is that we should adopt into
our criminal law, "positive" Samaritan legislation on the European model.
In spite of the lack of any certain evidence that the European legislation has
produced more Samaritan conduct in those countries than would have existed
without the legislation; in spite of the fact that we recognize that life-big
city life in particular-in North America has a tendency to foster indifference
to one's neighbour and his plight (though we by no means accept the
universality of this outlook as suggested by some writers), we feel that a trip
down the European road would be, at worst, a worthwhile experiment and,
more likely-and what we would expect-a permanent improvement in our
legal system.
We are confident that "positive" legislation presents no insuperable
juristic hurdles in enforcement or interpretation. There is relatively convincing
evidence that people do know the broad legal rubrics of their own jurisdiction
so that there is no reason to fear that consciousness of this positive obligation
will somehow fail to be absorbed into the community knowledge. The law
is a great teacher. That, as Zeisel's study shows, more Germans than Amer-
icans would act as Samaritans can, it is arguable, be attributed to the edu-
cational effect of the existence in Germany for twenty years of a "positive"
Samaritan law.
The law should, to a considerable extent, mirror the real moral values
of a society. We may not all be able to live up to the moral standards of the
Good Samaritan but we are taught, and we feel, that it is he we ought to
emulate, not the Priest or the Levite. A legal system which gives the advantage
to those two shirkers over the Samaritan creates in the citizen a sense of
injustice and invites disrepute.
Finally, there is clear evidence that an important segment of the public
is not only willing to accept such "positive" law but desires to see such an
obligation imposed. 115 Whether American doctors would share the views of
their Canadian colleagues is not certain. None of the U.S. medical surveys has,
so far as we know, posed the question of "positive" legislation,116 but it
would be in the humanitarian tradition of the American medical profession
to share this view. As a cause for physicians to take up, it is infinitely more
115See supra, text under heading "Surveys", Canadian survey, Q. 41.
116Zeisel's survey, supra, note 100, was directed at students.
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attractive than that of the "negative" Samaritan statutes, though both types
of legislation are ostensibly directed towards the same end, the increase of
acts of aid to "endangered persons".
As a precise model for "positive" legislation the simple form of the
French Article 63(2) is attractive, although the penalty provisions may be
excessive. 117 Whatever form was adopted there would certainly be legal
problems of considerable difficulty. For example, if all must be Samaritans
then inevitably some will suffer injury or loss in the course of their efforts
to render aid. Are they to be compensated, and, if so, by whom? What about
the expenditures of the Samaritan in aiding the victim-for example, blood
on the upholstery of his car? Are distinctions to be made between the
obligations of what might be called 'professional-type' Samaritans such as
physicians and policemen and "amateur" types such as lawyers? These
problems have all been faced by the Europeans and solved-more or less.
We can and should expect nothing less of our legal system.118
As for the "negative" North American form of Good Samaritan law,
there are reasonable grounds to argue for its disappearance from the
statute books. First of all, the common law, rules so far as they impose the
possibility of liability upon the well-meaning but incompetent Samaritan who
increases the endangered person's injuries rather than minimizes them, are
fair in their theory and have proved so in their practice. Secondly, of the 40
such pieces of legislation that now exist in their various exotic forms, it can
fairly be said that they have had no discernible legal impact. Except for those
that would create an absolute immunity from legal action for the errant
Samaritan 19 -and it is at this point that most legislatures120 and most 'fair-
minded' observers, 121 including physicians (if the Ontario survey is indicative)
balk-we believe there can be little practical effect of the sort their sponsors
hope for from these legislative exercises.
It is increasingly clear that the highwater mark in Good Samaritan
legislating was reached in the first half of the 1960's. Only a handful have
17See Rudzinski, supra, note 53 at 123, for a suggested model suitable for North
American usage.
l' 8 Dawson, supra, note 61, deals with some of these problems. Professor Wallace M.
Rudolph's brilliant article, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule (1965), 44 Nebraska L.
Rev. 499 touches just about all the bases on the problems which arise and the logical
resolution of them.
11 9 See discussion of "good faith" clauses, supra, at note 37.
120Most of the statutes contain some sort of exception for cases of "gross negligence"
or "wanton misconduct" or the like. See text, supra, at note 29. The exceptions may very
well eat up the whole.
121 See Yeutter, (1962), 41 Nebraska L. Rev. 609 at 616:
"Tort liability is based primarily on an analysis of social policy with its underlying
risk-bearing and loss distributing factors. In most areas of the law, the movement
has been toward extending liability. This, in contrast, is a no liability statute. Should
not the courts consider who is better able to bear the risk and distribute the loss-
the innocent injured party (who might be permanently disabled), or the negligent
physician, surgeon, or nurse? Legislators and the courts should give due consider-
ation to the precedent being established by these statutes. It has taken many years
to dent the doctrine of charitable immunities. Are we now to embark upon an era
of "Good Samaritan" immunities?"
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been added in the last five years. 122 Governor Kerner of Illinois stated the
essential case against Good Samaritan legislation in eloquent form in his
ultimately unsuccessful veto of the proposed Illinois Act in 1964:123
This is a type of statute that has come to be known as a 'Good Samaritan law',
and it has been adopted in one version or another in almost half of the states.
This has resulted from literature widely circulated among doctors recounting the
dire consequences in terms of malpractice litigation that can result from a physician's
humanitarian act in rendering emergency roadside care to an injured party. So far
as I can ascertain, the attendant danger to the physician is largely, if not wholly,
imagined. A systematic inquiry into all of the reported malpractice decisions has
failed to disclose a single such 'roadside instance'. Nor do I entertain any doubt
but that the courts of the State, in such an action, would take into consideration
all of the attendant circumstances and would not permit the unfair treatment of a
physician who had responded to such an emergency.
A leading text in the tort field has noted that the courts have exhibited a tenderness
to professional men that has 'few analogies in modem accident law' .... To treat
physicians with understanding, however, an approach with which I am in sympathy,
is quite a different thing from shielding them entirely from liability, regardless of
the carelessness exhibited or the damage occasioned thereby, which is what this
Bill does....
I do not believe that any class of citizens, be they physicians or otherwise,
should enjoy a superior position, legally insulated from the consequences of their
wrongful conduct.
The essential unfairness of this type of statute can be appreciated when it is
considered that any private citizen untrained in first aid, who volunteers in an
emergency may be held legally accountable for his actions, as may a nurse who is
less trained than the physician. But the doctor, who is the only one fully trained
to render emergency care, would be the very one rendered immune by this Bill
from the consequences of his negligent acts. And, unlike the private citizen who
responds, the action of the physician is not wholly voluntary, since fidelity to the
precepts of his profession requires him in an emergency to render service to the
best of his ability.
At the end, however, in spite of the logic and morality of the case against
these "negative" statutes, we would not recommend that they be struck from
the books and, indeed, would be prepared to countenance their spread to the
other States and Provinces, so long as they contained the "gross negligence"
proviso.124
Because, although as Governor Kerner put it "the danger is imaginary",
the fear is, evidently, quite real. Irrational it may be but it shows up in all
the surveys as the major reason given for failure to stop. Although they do
not see him in the shadow of patients who arrive at their office door, the
doctors of North America are convinced, in spite of all arguments and
statistics to the contrary, that Melvin Belli125 is poised, ready to pounce, in
the ditch just beyond the roadside accident victim they are thinking of aiding.
If the physicians of Ontario who, according to our study, will stop to aid the
accident victim and do generally perceive that the common law rules are not
harsh on the Samaritan, want such a statute avidly-as they do-then the
122 Connecticut and Massachusetts in 1968; Alberta in 1969 are all we have discovered.
123Memorandum disapproving Ill. House Bill 1489 (August 26, 1964). The Illinois
statute was eventually passed in 1965. See Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 91, s. 2A.
124 1n other words, if as we see it, they will not really cause any hardship to the
deserving plaintiff.
125 Mr. Belli is probably the most famous plaintiffs' lawyer in North America.
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collective disquiet-probably not only amongst doctors but in the public at
large as well-must be considerable. To lay the spectre to rest (though
quaere whether it will), a legislative placebo of this sort is a cheap price.
Particularly if it proved helpful in making the passage of "positive"
Samaritan laws acceptable in our North American community!
Actually, there is nothing patently inconsistent with both types of statute
co-existing. The "positive" statute is concerned with getting people to com-
mence to aid those endangered. The "negative" statute can then play its role
in reducing the standard of care required of the altruistic actor in the emer-
gency circumstances in which he is acting. This is basically the French position
today. For purposes of any civil action which might arise through the errors
of the Samaritan, the standard of care that he is held to is really that expected
under the "gross negligence" type of North American Samaritan statute, or,
in practical terms, that expected by the common law.
We would offer one final recommendation. If one assumes the passage
of "positive" legislation in North America, followed by a considerable increase
in the amount of Samaritanism toward accident victims, the question of the
effectiveness of the aid rendered to the victims then becomes critical. Perhaps
we can assume that when the medical Samaritan happens on the scene, the
aid rendered will be usually competent and as effective as the circumstances
permit. However, when the Samaritan is a layman, as obviously much more
often will be the case, then the effectiveness of the emergency help given is
much more likely to be doubtful, perhaps even harmful, considering the
present state of popular knowledge of emergency first aid principles.
We would suggest that, following the introduction of a "positive" duty
to aid,126 consideration be given to the introduction of a crash programme in
"first aid" education for the general public, similar to that given in wartime,
or perhaps, more effectively, the introduction of a requirement that all licensed
automobile drivers be required to pass a test in basic 'first aid' knowledge,
as is the case with those who seek pilots' licences in some countries. Perhaps
it would be a realistic contribution to the problem of slaughter on the highways
to combine with such a licensing requirement, a requirement that all new
automobiles come equipped with a standardized first aid kit,127 in the way
that other types of safety factors are becoming mandatory. With a "positive"
law requiring aid to be rendered, with basic first aid equipment in the first
car to come along and a broad base of the population with a knowledge of
such simple skills as how to apply a tourniquet, where to locate pressure
points to control bleeding, and how to put an accident victim into the shock
position, many needless deaths on the highway would be prevented, and many
injuries that could otherwise be critical would be minimized.
126 One of the authors must confess that he has undergone a substantial change of
views over the last six months on the question of the introduction of "positive" Samaritan
legislation on the North American scene. See Sharpe, Good Samaritan Legislation (1972),
Ontario Medical Review 220 at 287, for this previously held viewpoint.
127A realistic, after-accident emphasis would appear warranted in view of the fact
that Nader-inspired safety precautions have not as yet justified their existence (see supra,
note 7). It is interesting to note that all new Mercedes Benz 350SLC automobiles contain
a first-aid kit under a lift-up lid on the package tray as standard equipment. (See Road and
Track, November, 1972, at 36).

